Abstract. The central question of this study is whether and how the broader paradigmatic changes in social discourse, as exemplified by the postmodernism debate, are reflected in the practical world of local land-use regulations, specifically the design-review processes. We identify the paradigmatic themes of postmodernism as 'place', 'sustainability', and 'participative democracy'. To address this central question we surveyed the officials in positions of implementing land-use controls in 87 (out of a sample set of 177) communities in Wisconsin having a population ranging from 2000 to 100 000, in order to identify their attitudes towards design review. In addition to questions on existing land-use regulations, our survey asked what types of objectives may be accomplished by design review and how, that is, whether they should be addressed by land-use regulations at all and, if so, the desired degree of 'formality' of the regulations. The data, analyzed by Ward's cluster analysis method (using SAS), show three different sets of attitudes to design review: (1) modernist technocratic, (2) postmodernist technocratic, and (3) postmodernist critical. Here we discuss these attitudes in terms of the types of objectives they address and the formality of regulations that they favor. Unlike the modernist point of view that strives to establish universal relationships as the basis for review standards, the postmodernist view suggests a situational research approach to discover relationships that may be unique and local. However, a design-review process that allows and encourages critical dialogue and interpretation, rather than self-administrating standards, is more vulnerable to public and legal challenges. This necessitates new operational and practical methodologies for education, planning, and design review that are capable of responding to the challenges of the emerging postmodernist views.
Introduction
In the last few decades we have witnessed substantive changes in local land-use and design review. The increasing complexity of the regulations, growing scope of controls, increasing administrative discretion, and relaxation in traditional control tools such as zoning, are among these changes. At the same time, in a parallel way, issues and themes in social discourse have also changed. New assumptions about what successful control mechanisms ought to address and how-about the appropriate form of controls, desirable level of administrative discretion, and reasonable scope of regulations-have emerged in the social discourse in the city hall, the courts and public media. However, there are few inventories that focus on these changes at the local level.
The central question of this study is whether and how the broader postwar paradigmatic changes in social discourse are reflected in local planning and design controls, specifically the official attitudes on design review. In this study, design review is defined as all the processes by which private and public development proposals receive scrutiny, guidance, and/or control by a local government.
The paradigmatic themes of postmodernism are identified as 'place', 'sustainability', and 'participative democracy' (Sancar 1992; . Our research focuses on the attitudes of public officials who are responsible for determining and implementing land-use controls about what types of values should be the focus of government regulations and the desired form of regulations in terms of 'formal' and 'informal' types. This paper has two main sections. In the first section formal and informal types are introduced, followed by a discussion of postmodern paradigms. In the second section we summarise the research methodology and results of our study of designreview practice in small towns. We argue that the three postmodern paradigms-place, sustainability, and participation-by introducing new issues and concepts into design review have (a) expanded the scope of planning and design regulations, and (b) resulted in new attitudes among public officials that challenge the conventional bureaucratic application of formal controls.
Formal and informal types of controls
Governmental control over social activities can be informal as well as formal. Formal control assumes a bureaucratic process working efficiently by means of written law, intended to be a 'gapless', internally consistent, abstract, and rationally designed system. The application of law to any specific case is politically neutral and predictable because the decisions are logical deductions from the law. This process is administered by specialized professionals acting as neutral bureaucrats. Weber (1954) , who says that formal control is the ultimate state in the evolution of law, describes how the internal logic of this ideal type works:
"First, that every formal legal decision be the 'application' of an abstract legal proposition to a concrete Tact situation'; second, that it must be possible in every concrete case to derive the decision from abstract legal propositions by means of legal logic; third, that the law must actually or virtually constitute a 'gapless' system of legal propositions, or must, at least, be treated as if it were such a gapless system; fourth, that whatever that cannot be construed legally in rational terms is also legally irrelevant; and fifth, that every social action of human beings must always be visualized as either an 'application' or 'execution' of legal propositions, or an infringement thereof" (Weber, 1954, page 64) .
In the field of sociology of law, informal control is defined by legal empiricists (also known as legal realists) as the 'living law', that is, it is based on what is actually happening in society. For example, Macauley (1966) analyzes how formal legal activities create and support informal processes. He shows how the introduction of new legislation sometimes confers on certain agencies discretionary powers or legitimacy to conduct mediation or arbitration between stakeholders. Shapiro (1981) shows that many informal processes occur in tandem with the formal activities of courts and suggests that judges play significant roles in initiating various informal processes such as mediation, arbitration, or negotiation. Likewise, Schuck (1986) describes the importance of informal processes in Agent Orange litigation. Drawing a picture quite different from Weber's, these scholars conclude that most of the time legal processes work not in isolation but in conjunction with informal processes, where staff members act as participants rather than neutral bureaucrats, and political (or otherwise valueladen) interests exert influences on the process.
It is important to note that Weber (1954) sees the formal model as an 'ideal type' toward which the legal processes in capitalist industrial society move. Consequently, this model provides the comparative yardstick by which existing legal processes should be judged. The legal empiricists, on the other hand, use the informal model to study the actual legal process and its social consequences. In this study we take these two types as the two extremes of a continuum (model presented in figure 1 ) and express, respectively, modern and postmodern assumptions.
As any control system starts to employ discretion and interpretation, its emphasis shifts towards procedural rules and its substantive content begins to change. Formal rules contain mandatory specifications leaving no need for mutual adjustment through Paradigmatic assumptions within modernism and postmodernism corresponding to formalization and informalization movements For Weber, instrumental rationality, formal law, and bureaucracy are inseparable processes associated with the development of capitalism in modern societies (Bierne, 1982; Giddens, 1971) . What is important here is that when this kind of rationality is employed in planning it demands a high degree of technocracy and formal control. This in turn establishes formalization of planning and design controls as one of the essential conditions of civic society and the modern state. This world view is now recognized as 'modernist'. Friedmann (1987) summarizes the recent history of planning as a progression towards rationalization. Planning is a product of modern capitalist societies and has progressed concurrently with the "gradual breakdown of the 'organic' order of feudal society" (page 21). Thus, one of the consequences of the broader changes in social structure was the emergence of planning as a distinct social function. In the post-World War 2 era many contemporary planners advanced a theory of planning based on instrumental rationality. During the 1950s and 1960s, Western planning thought became almost coterminous with the rational-comprehensive model (Weaver et al, 1985, page 157) that provided an abstract and idealized linear procedure efficiently linking available means to given ends. For example, Taylor (1984) invites scholars to advocate and apply a procedural planning theory that involves identifying the problem, identifying possible courses of action, evaluating these possible courses, implementing them, monitoring, review, and evaluation. The theory implies a linear step-by-step process abstracted and freed from the specific context of particular situations. Inherent in instrumental rationality is also the notion of planning as a means to apply 'objective knowledge' to public decisionmaking. For example, Faludi (1985) states that, in the same manner that the scientific method provides methodological standards for scientists, instrumental rationality provides standards for planners to demarcate 'responsible' decisions from 'ill-founded' ones. According to Faludi, instrumental rationality is not only a tool to achieve the best decision, but also a condition of legitimation. In other words, Faludi believes that 'objective knowledge', together with formal procedural standards of rationality, gives planners grounds to claim that their decisions are value neutral and universally valid.
Modernist planning
The modernist approach to planning is also associated with technocratic and formal control processes that ideally would be centralized for efficiency and operate at regional, national, or even international scales. Studies of accurate and extensive land records, careful assessment of all possible courses of action to determine the best one for the public interest while maintaining value neutrality are among the notable characteristics of this approach.
Postmodern assumptions for territorial controls The criticisms voiced against the call of modernism for technocracy and instrumentally rational planning ultimately triggered a paradigm shift from technocratic objectivism toward a plurality of paradigms (Habermas, 1970) . The emerging paradigms of place, sustainability, and participation challenge the appropriateness of the rational model to address contemporary issues such as loss of sense of place, environmental integrity, and local autonomy. These constructs are interpreted in different ways depending on whether the interpreter makes formalist or informalist assumptions (see figure 1) .
Place paradigm
The construct of place (as the antithesis of space) refers to the meaning and significance of particular place experiences that abstract spatial analysis cannot capture. This perspective, especially the concept of authentic place identity, has been useful in contrasting modern international-style architecture to vernacular and premodern urban environments. Numerous articles have contrasted 'sense of place', which implies warmth and empathy, with impersonal, generic, and alienating modern environments built since the 1920s (Alexander et al, 1987; Calthorpe, 1993; Jacobs and Appleyard, 1987; Norberg-Schulz, 1985; Trancik, 1987;  to name a few among many others). White (1989) argues that, unlike the separation of uses in traditional zoning, variety of uses in a given place supports place-bound socialization and thus encourages collective place identity. Oldenburg (1988) studies places such as cafes, tea houses, bars, beer gardens, etcwhere place-bound social contacts occur-and suggests that the existence of social activities in these places, which he calls 'third places', increases their significance in daily life cycles; it adds authenticity and increases people's attention and care for 'place' in general.
The notion of 'care' for places implies protection, which is the basis of many preservation-oriented control mechanisms. As the paradigm evolved, the claims of authenticity, place identity, and sense of place became legitimate grounds to apply public control over private property. Aesthetics, as an inseparable component of the experimental framework of place interpretations, also became legitimate grounds for regulation.
What forms of control do these grounds indicate or require? So far, the place paradigm has been supported by objectivist, subjectivist, and intersubjectivist interpretations. The oppositions among these views are significant within the paradigm, and for design review, because each interpretation calls for a different form of control.
The objectivist view claims that places possess certain qualities or properties independent from people's perceptions and attitudes. These qualities may be identified as authenticity; they may give the place (or object) a special character, a sense of place, or aesthetic ambiance and are assumed to be in the place waiting to be appreciated. Once these values or attributes are identified, it is possible to formulate rules to preserve them as 'resources'. Various objectivist studies have attempted to define and record the visual qualities of natural landscapes (Morisawa, 1971; Palakowski, 1975; Riotte et al, 1975 ; for a review see Brooks and Lavigne, 1985) . Similarly, most historic preservation guidelines are based on the concept of authenticity as an inherent quality that can be defined in terms of visual attributes (such as style and features of historical buildings). Within this framework, the introduction of new concepts such as place character or identity acknowledges the existence of additional qualities embodied by certain places, waiting to be identified, measured, and preserved.
The subjectivist view, on the contrary, denotes that place character, identity, or aesthetic qualities can exist apart from people's emotions, sentiments, and personal memories. It therefore provides no grounds for public control over private property for the purposes of preserving these qualities of place. After all, a place can be meaningless, faceless, and ugly for some, but still be meaningful and aesthetically pleasing for others: 'beauty is in the eye of the beholder'.
The intersubjectivist view incorporates the basic subjectivist assumption that there cannot be a priori place categories such as 'authentic' or 'artificial', apart from people's emotions, memories, and attitudes. But it differs from the subjectivist view by asserting that the values people attach to places are constructed socially and shared collectively. The public can agree that certain places or objects-buildings, plazas, scenic views, valleys, mountains-do symbolize certain values or reveal significant attachments and are therefore worthy of preservation (Appleyard, 1979) . Moreover, in the face of rapid environmental change, people may identify their rootedness with these places, so that infringements upon the places or objects threaten the values and identities. Costonis (1989) , one of the major supporters of this view, calls these objects 'icons'. He claims that the disturbance of icons by the intrusion of new developments-aliens-is tantamount to the destruction of what those icons symbolize:
"Other paired icons and aliens are readily called from court reports of the last quarter-century's battles. Illustrative are a pump storage plant (alien) scarring the Hudson Valley's Storm King Mountain (icon); a 307-foot tourist tower (alien) desecrating the Gettysburg National Cemetery (icon); a strapping office complex (alien) soaring above and demeaning the nation's Capitol (icon); power transmission lines (alien) contaminating the view across New Haven Bay (icon); Marcel Breuer's hard-edged, fifty-two-story tower (alien) heckling [Manhattan's] Beaux Arts Grand Central Terminal" (Costonis, 1989, page 57) . The associations that make a place or an object an icon are not permanent; they are subject to change. At the time of construction, both the Eiffel Tower and the Golden Gate Bridge were seen as alien by many people. Moreover, even the meaning of shared place memories can change in time. Some memories are 'better forgotten'; disaster, or a shameful and horrible event, such as a massacre, can change the meaning of a place and create a collective discomfort.
The intersubjectivist view calls for a dynamic form of control. It assumes that development is not disturbing unless it is perceived as alien. Furthermore there is a tolerable degree of intrusion by aliens, and collective sentiments defining this tolerance can also change in time. Therefore public regulation for preservation cannot depend on bureaucratically applied static standards. Instead preservation of icons requires continuous reinterpretation of changing collective sentiments. In other words, the intersubjectivist interpretation of the place paradigm calls for informal controls based on social communication.
Sustainability paradigm
In the history of American conservation, the opposition between 'resource conservation' and 'nature preservation' goes back to the turn of this century. The resource conservation movement advocated 'wide use' of natural resources in a utilitarian and efficient way; the nature preservation movement advocated preservation of natural areas untouched, so that humans might appreciate and learn from the sublime quality of nature (Koppes, 1987) . The resource-conservation advocates supported rational and scientific resource management within agencies such as the National Forest Service; the nature preservationists introduced ethical principles such as respecting wildlife for its own sake, concerns that guided the establishment of the National Park Service and later the Fish and Wildlife Service. In the 1960s and 1970s the environmental movement gained a large popular basis and the concept of sustainability was introduced into social discourse; two distinct views of sustainability emerged with differing implications for design review.
The first view focuses on the ecological management of biotic systems. It advocates the control of resources and management of ecosystems in a coordinated and scientific manner [for example, Ahern's (1991) management model to implement an 'extensive open space system']. This view encourages centralized management. In the face of the rapid destruction of ecosystems it places controlling human activities ahead of equity and cultural diversity. It depends almost exclusively on the scientific method to collect information and diagnose systemic problems, and on technocratic rational planning to control land use. It advocates standards and regulates compliance through an autoadministrative bureaucratic system.
The second view emphasizes the linkages among cultural, biotic and abiotic, aspects of environmental relations. Sustaining cultural diversity is an aim inseparable from sustaining biodiversity. For example, Greider and Garkovich (1994) emphasize the importance of cultural definitions in assessing environmental impacts. This view contextualizes environmental problems in broader systematic structure where social and cultural processes form the significant part of systemic relations (Nassauer, 1992; Thorne and Huang, 1991) . In this view, sustainability requires, first, a shared understanding of environmental problems and, second, a public commitment to the goal of sustainability . Although it was initiated at the federal level and was criticized as being toothless, the requirement of the 1969 National Environmental Protection Act for the preparation of environmental impact statements effectively initiated a local argumentation process. For example, the "statement of public purpose" section requires an exploration of contexts that in turn establishes a clear link between public goals and local ecological processes, thus increasing public understanding and establishing a common ground among the different parties before a major federal project can be implemented.
Participation paradigm
Among the three paradigms, participation is the one that directly opposes authoritarian, technocratic, formal control over social actions. The initial enthusiasm for the possibility of social engineering and scientific management of social systems died a few decades after World War 2, and planners and others began to challenge the theoretical basis of such planning. Rittel and Webber (1973) , for instance, suggested that it is impossible to follow the rational model in dealing with planning problems, because these types of problems are 'wicked'. Contrasting the viewpoints of residents of Boston's North End with the views of planners and bankers, Jacobs (1961) challenged the assumption of value neutrality by asserting that what the technocrats say and what people want are often different. The equity planners questioned the appropriateness of externalizing 'value and ethics' and the notion of a value-neutral planner (Davidoff, 1965; Krumholz, 1982) . Hasson and Goldberg (1987, page 15) argued that "separation of rationalism from ethics is more imagined than real". On the issue of implementing the rational procedural model, Lindblom made a convincing argument that the planning process is and ought to be incremental rather than rational (Lindblom, 1959) and suggested that coordination can be achieved without a central authority, that is, "people can coordinate with each other without anyone's coordinating them" (Lindblom, 1965, page 3) . Addressing the procedural and substantive issues, Forester (1988a) suggested that planners face questions of both equity and efficiency and deal with both uncertainty and ambiguity in everyday practice. Forester (1988a) argued that the misleading separation of facts and values puts planners in a position where practical issues are reduced to technical matters. Elsewhere Forester (1988b) suggested that reducing political and ethical issues to technical ones and manipulating public ignorance in defence of professional power creates unnecessary dependency, generates unrealistic expectations, and immobilizes and depoliticizes the general public.
The basic assumptions of the 'participation' paradigm stand on these and similar observations. Participation is crucial in achieving effective planning. Moreover, the paradigm sees participation as a condition to improve the quality of life. Smith (1973) suggests that participation increases the effectiveness and adaptivity of planning and design and the flexibility and stability of society. The paradigm also assumes that participation is both a means to obtain higher goals, such as social and environmental justice, and a goal in itself. Participation should widen the circle of citizens who represent the breadth and diversity of a community engaged in a collaborative dialogue throughout the planning and design process (Sancar, 1993) .
The above-mentioned aspects of the participation paradigm are in opposition to a formal technocratic form of control in design review. Since the 1960s, reconciling rationality, accountability, and procedural equity has been the major challenge in planning theory and practice. Planners have responded by suggesting a communication-based model of planning (Forester, 1989; Goldstein, 1984; among others) . In such a model a control system is proposed where decisions produced by means of argumentation push the focus of control towards procedural institutionalization rather than the internal logic of substantive regulations, and it therefore requires substantial relaxation in formal controls.
Today place, sustainability, and participation paradigms coexist with the modernist approach. Coexistence of a multiplicity of paradigms in planning and design discourse is a postmodern connotation. Therefore we expect a parallel multiplicity of attitudes in design-review practice.
Design-review practice
We conducted a questionnaire survey to identify the attitudes of local officials about desired degrees of formality and discretion in dealing with postmodern values in land-use and design review. In the following section, the survey design and the characteristics of respondents will be outlined. We then present the three different types of attitudes we found among public officials, based on an analysis of the public objectives and the desired degree of formality of regulations for controlling land use.
Study area, population, and sample set
The study area for the survey is the 357 Wisconsin communities having populations ranging from 2 000 to 100 000 persons. This range excludes the state's two largest cities, Madison and Milwaukee, as well as many very small communities, where complex design-review processes are likely to be rare or absent.
A pilot study was first conducted on 30 randomly chosen communities in May 1993. The survey was then sent to a random sample of 177 communities in August 1993. The sample was selected by random sampling stratified within each of the areas covered by the nine Regional Planning Commissions in Wisconsin. The survey was sent to the design-review officials who were most knowledgeable about planning and design controls in their communities: clerks, elected officials, planning commission members, zoning board members, mayors, zoning administrators, building inspectors, and members of design-review boards. This list was obtained by a phone interview asking each community clerk to name the person in the community who was most knowledgeable on design-review issues.
Characteristics of respondents The questions on "Official attitudes about design review" are part of the larger survey that focuses on existing planning and design-review functions in the respondent communities. The response rate for the attitudes section of the Local Planning and Design Review Survey is 49%, that is, 87 out of 177 communities. The respondents' credentials vary: 33% had planning credentials, 16% had design credentials, and 25% had engineering credentials (table 1) . Half the respondents were planning staff members; 33% were building inspectors (or zoning administrators); 26% were members of planning commissions; 19% were community clerks; and 9% were members of Note: The question asking the credentials of respondents was answered by only 58 out of 87 respondents. Therefore the 29 respondents who have neither design, engineering, nor planning credentials form 50% of the 58. The percentages of the respondents having design, engineering, or planning credentials do not add up to 50% because some respondents have two of the three credentials. Survey questions: importance of objectives and the desired degrees of formality of regulations The survey provided a list of objectives and asked what should be regulated and how (see the excerpt from the questionnaire, figure 2, over). This part of the survey focused on two issues: the importance of the objectives (question 1), and the desired degree of formality in regulation. Formality breaks down into three constructs: mandatoriness (question 2), universality (question 3), and prescriptive specificity (question 4); see table 5. Mandatoriness refers to whether the rules are advisory or mandatory; universality refers to whether the rules are situational, that is, developed and applied case by case, or universally applicable; prescriptive specificity refers to whether the rules are expressed as general guidelines or as specific standards. These three concepts involve both the substance of written rules and the procedures for implementing written rules (that*is, they imply different levels of interpretation, bargaining, and argumentation). A mandatory, universally applicable, specifically written prescriptive rule (such as the codes that apply to fire escapes) leaves little room for interpretation or discretion. On the other hand, general guidelines imply that case-by-case application can be effective only by means of persuasion-either on-the-scene conversations or the persuasive power of the intentions, criteria, or motives. In the light of the postmodern values, one would expect new attitudes towards the substantive rules and their procedural implications. To investigate this, we asked the respondents to rate the importance of the traditional utilitarian and economic objectives (a, b, e, and k in the survey), as well as objectives related to preserving sense of place (c, j, n, i, and 1 in the survey), and objectives related to ecological sustainability (d, f, and g in the survey). "Other general objectives" (h and m in the survey) constitute a fourth group (see table 6). Table 5 shows a formality scale varying from 1 (least formal) to 5 (most formal). The data on desired formality of regulations, that is, the information obtained from the questions about mandatoriness, universality, and specificity, was coded by means of this formality scale. We analyzed this information, together with the information obtained from question 1, by Ward's cluster analysis method [using the SAS software (SAS Institute Inc., Cary, NC)]. There were four distinct clusters having the simple tree structure shown in figure 3. There were 41 respondents in cluster A, 27 in B, 13 in C, and 6 in D.
Data analysis and results
In order to identify the unique characteristics of each cluster, we first examine attitudes towards regulation in general. Table 7 shows that there is a consensus that government regulation is appropriate in order to achieve two of the objectives in the list of fourteen: protecting "natural landscapes and wildlife" and protecting "community stability and property values". c A Figure 3 . The tree structure of the four clusters. are lower than 90%.
The hands-off group
For all other objectives, cluster D has lower percentages whereas in clusters A, B, and C almost all the respondents believe that all the objectives justify regulation (table 7, over). We therefore refer to cluster D as 'the hands-off group'. The rest of the clusters are differentiated not by their propensity to approve regulations per se but by how formal they think the regulation should be and how important they think the various objectives are. We analyzed this information by plotting, for each cluster, the degree of importance of each type of objective versus the degree of desired formality of regulations.
Importance -formality plots
The importance rating of an objective is the average of the values that the respondents in a cluster assigned to that objective. The degree of formality for an objective is the average of the answers to questions 2, 3, and 4. The importance -formality plots (figures 4, 5, 6) display this information separately for each cluster of respondents. The horizontal axis represents importance and the vertical axis formality. Each point on the plot corresponds to an objective, and different types of objectives are shown with different symbols. In short, these plots present three kinds of information at once: type of objectives; importance the respondents, on average, assigned to it; and degree of formality the respondents believed to be appropriate in regulations addressing it.
Four distinct attitudes
The hands-off group Table 7 indicates that this group is significantly different from the others in terms of their wish to cover the least number of issues by planning and design controls. There were only six officials in this group. Because they did not believe in planning regulations in general, they did not entertain the notion of 'degree of formality'. Therefore we do not have an importance -formality plot for the hands-off group. Other than sharing a handsoff attitude, the officials in this group did not have common characteristics regarding their occupation, the region or the type of community. Their viewpoint is a significant one and may be represented by a higher number of officials in other parts of the nation.
The technocratic modernist attitude
The plot for cluster A (figure 4) has three unique characteristics that differentiate it from other plots. First, there is a roughly linear relation between importance and formality values. For the respondents in cluster A, if an objective is important it should be controlled by means of formal rules; or if an objective is controlled by formal rules it must be important. Second, there is a clear separation in both importance and formality between economic-utilitarian objectives (asterisks) and other objectives (dark squares and dark diamonds). Third, compared with other clusters, cluster A has a large variance in importance scores: not all objectives are equally important, and the difference between them matters. Figure 4. Importance -formality graph for cluster A. (Note: In order to help readers to identify each objective in the plots above, the objectives in each category are presented in order of formality from higher to lower degrees. For example, among the economic-utilitarian objectives, b has the highest and k the lowest degree of formality.) These three characteristics together display a 'technocratic modernist' attitude. This attitude differentiates the 'matters of consequence', economic and utilitarian issues, as highly important, warranting highly formal rules. Environmental and aesthetic or place-oriented issues, on the contrary, are relatively less important and are to be controlled informally.
This attitude is consistent with the modernist view with its appeal to instrumental rationality in constructing the internal consistency of law. Instrumental rationality calls for formal controls and separates economic and utilitarian objectives as more important than others, such as distributional equity or rootedness. For example, historic preservation may be justified by expectations of increased property values in a gentrifying district; the secondary objective is justified through the primary one.
The technocratic postmodernist attitude
In cluster B all types of objectives are important, and the desired form of regulation for all of them is formal control (figure 5, over). This is a 'technocratic postmodernist' attitude. It is postmodern because the desired scope of controls includes a multiplicity of equally important objectives. It is technocratic because it favors formal rules based on objective standards and eliminates the need for discretion. The technocratic postmodernist attitude looks for ways to define standards even for aesthetic objectives; it employs objectivist reasoning and relies heavily on expert judgement in formulating regulations. The critical postmodernist attitude Among the three, the plot of cluster C has the lowest variance in importance (figure 6). These respondents, even more than those in cluster B, exhibit a typically postmodern multiplicity of interests and concerns. But unlike the technocratic postmodernists of cluster B, the respondents in cluster C clearly prefer informality. The low formality values, which vary around 2 and 3, correspond to a preference for advisory guidelines and mandatory recommendations, some to be applied areawide but most to special districts, that state the public intent and the general criteria and provide illustrations. All these properties imply significant administrative discretion and therefore an argumentative political process whereby interest groups communicate.
Borrowing the term from Habermas and Forester, we refer to respondents in cluster C as 'critical' postmodernists. Forester (1989, page 139) explains that "critical theory assesses social and political-economic structures as systematic patterns of communicative interaction". Critical theorists' emphasis on "argumentative practices" (Forester, page 145) contrasts markedly with the technocratic design-review framework, whose formal rules leave no room for interpretation or argumentation.
In especially sharp contrast to respondents in cluster A, those in cluster C assigned lower formality as well as importance values to economic -utilitarian objectives (asterisks) than to others. This group seems to consider economic and utilitarian issues, such as private property values and human comfort and security, as matters of private interest, and therefore warranting a process where parties with different interests can communicate with each other. Other concerns, for example, environmental objectives, are regarded as addressing public interests and therefore necessitating relatively more formalized controls, although the absolute values assigned still reflect a belief in interpretive, argumentative, processes.
Implications of reviewers' attitudes
These four attitudes coexist in the context of design review and shape the regulation cultures. To what extent are these attitudes universal? The history of planning and its legal context in the United States show unique characteristics that are unlike those in other countries. Therefore it is difficult to speculate on how our findings would apply to other countries. However, we would expect to find similar attitudes in different parts of the USA, albeit with different distributions based on local history and political context. With these caveats, we will now discuss the implications of our research.
Each attitude defines a different research agenda. The technocratic point of view strives to establish universal relationships as the basis of design-review standards; the critical postmodernist view strives to discover relationships that may be unique and local. But a design-review process that encourages critical dialogue and interpretation, rather than universal standards, is vulnerable to public and legal challenges. Critical postmodernism therefore necessitates new operational and practical methodologies for design review.
There are 41 respondents in cluster A (technocratic modernist), 27 in B (technocratic postmodernist), 13 in C (critical postmodernist), and 6 in D (hands-off). Why this imbalance? Is it because new paradigms are in the early stages of entering the design-review context? Or because the respondents are aware of the potential political and legal challenges? Is it because, in certain communities, local officials are reluctant to exercise discretion and encourage argumentation because these communities lack tools to deal with problems associated with these practices? Does the type of community make a difference? For instance, do officials in smaller towns feel more inclined to adopt a critical postmodernist attitude? Table 8 presents for each cluster the percentages of respondents who have characterized their communities as urban, suburban, 'edge' city, small town, or rural. The distribution for cluster C indicates that the respondents are indeed predominantly from small towns, where one may expect to find relatively less complex design-review processes and more possibilities of face-toface contact. On the other hand, the distribution of small towns across the clusters indicates that the majority of small-town officials are actually in cluster A, so though small-town contexts may foster critical postmodernism, they do not guarantee it. Table 9 shows that officials in cluster C are from smaller communities with lower populations, fewer ordinances, and, probably, less complex planning and design processes. Moreover, table 9 indicates that officials in clusters A and B reported more conflicts and litigations than those in cluster C. It may be that respondents who favor technocratic approaches shy away from administrative discretion and public involvement in the review process because they have had firsthand experience with legal and political challenges associated with design review in general. We believe that the critical postmodernist attitude will gain broader support as new methodologies and practical tools are developed to overcome the challenges in discretionary review practices.
Most of the conflicts that arise in design review are related to the questions of (1) lack of predictability, (2) arbitrary use of discretionary power, or (3) lack of justifiable basis for design review (AIA, 1974; Lai, 1988) . Technocratic approaches employ formal rules in order to deal with these three issues. Formal rules are entirely predictable; they do not call for administrative discretion and hence eliminate arbitrary use of discretionary power; and they are backed by objective expert-generated knowledge. These strengths, however, are achieved at the expense of eliminating chances for local interpretation, closing the gates for alternative problem definitions, and therefore alienating interested groups from design-review processes.
A design-review process that encourages administrative discretion tempered by critical communication and public dialogue cannot be implemented by establishing formal regulations; it needs practical procedural mechanisms or tools to administer control processes. Earlier we discussed the centrality of participation in making discretionary systems accountable, and the potential role of 'designerly' argumentation in eliminating distortions in communication. In addition to mechanisms to facilitate participation, new tools are also needed to deal with the challenges of providing certainty and finding a valid basis for review in discretionary review systems. Such tools have already been proposed and implemented. For example, Lefcoe (AIA, 1974) proposes opinion writing to record the precedents that ultimately would be used to update the review guidelines (or regulations). A procedure such as this simulates the evolutionary dynamics of common law and would establish a design-review tradition in the long term-in which outcomes would be predictable and accountability would be increased by clearly articulated opinions and precedents that are available for public scrutiny.
The problem of finding a valid basis for design review is also critical, especially where aesthetic and place-identity-related purposes are concerned (Brooks and Lavigne, 1985; Rowlett, 1981) . The modernist view eliminates (or ignores) this problem by subordinating these concerns to the more important economic-utilitarian objectives, that is, aesthetic and place-identity-related concerns are valid only if they are economically justifiable or proven to be efficient. A technocratic postmodernist view, on the contrary, relies on objectivist assumptions and expert-generated knowledge to validate the basis of design review in aesthetic and place-identity-related issues. But, as concerns about adjustability and variety in design increase, objectivist assumptions become inadequate to provide a valid aesthetic basis for regulating development (Brooks and Lavigne, 1985; Costonis, 1989) . The postmodernist technocratic view attempts to increase responsiveness and variety in design by means of complex and detailed rules. Complex and detailed rules, however, as we noted above, create problems in terms of accountability.
The postmodernist critical view requires a valid basis to withstand these challenges in responding to issues such as community character and sense of place (Lightner, 1992; Pouler, 1992) . In the search for a valid design-review basis, Supreme Court Justice William Brennan's rule is worth mentioning. Brennan suggests that aesthetic controls should be recognized as valid "only on the condition that the community demonstrate a 'comprehensive coordinated effort' at addressing the overall problem of environmental aesthetics" (Lai, 1988, page 317) . Taking Brennan's suggestion one step further, we propose that a shared community vision which is comprehensive, that is, addressing all the objectives-aesthetic, utilitarian, environmental-would provide a valid basis for design review. The central issue in strengthening design review legally and politically is to develop a holistic, collectively shared, vision for a community's future (see Sancar, 1993) , and a clear process for updating it periodically.
In conclusion, problems related to certainty, accountability, and validity continue to stand as barriers to achieving a dynamic, interactive, and critical design-review process. For the postmodernist critical attitude to take hold among local planning officials, it is crucial to develop further the rational basis and the appropriate technologies for its implementation.
